



**RISK AND  
EAST ASIA**  
DFG GRADUIERTEN  
KOLLEG 1613



**IN-EAST**  
INSTITUTE OF  
EAST ASIAN STUDIES

# **RISK AND EAST ASIA CONFERENCE 2018**

Organized by

**DFG Research Training Group 1613/2  
“Risk and East Asia”**

**IN-EAST Institute of East Asian Studies  
University of Duisburg-Essen**

**June 20–21, 2018**

**Die Wolfsburg, Falkenweg 6, Mülheim an der Ruhr**

**REA 2018**

**DFG** Deutsche  
Forschungsgemeinschaft

UNIVERSITÄT  
**DUISBURG  
ESSEN**

*Offen im Denken*



## Editorial

The final conference of the Graduiertenkolleg is an opportunity to reflect on what we have learnt in the process. Beyond the achievements of individual doctoral students which we have already celebrated and will continue to celebrate as they complete their research we must ask ourselves what the outcomes of “Risk in East Asia” after all are.

The title of the Graduiertenkolleg, “Risk and East Asia”, has stimulated us throughout the two funding periods. A flagpole theme that rallied our minds and gave us a fleeting sense of shared direction, “risk” was useful because it escaped unified definition and allowed the doctoral research projects the freedom to develop without forced recourse to dogmas and templates. “Risk” was meant to encapsulate the types of issues often encountered when examining institutional change, in particular institutions inclining to become more marketized, devolved, individualized/socialized or international, types of change easily identified in the three main countries of East Asia (China, Japan and Korea) and approaches vested in politics, sociology and economics. This broad framing bore fruit, not because of its rigor and inherent system or logic, but because it created oblique questions about and weird perspectives on the research projects. We never filled all the 36 nodes in the grid (like marketization in three countries and three disciplines, devolution in three countries and three disciplines, and so on), but the projects nonetheless covered a wide range of issues in excellent doctoral projects that each contributed new knowledge.

We are not any closer to an all-encompassing, innovative and coherent theory of risk and East Asia as such. Instead, the projects of the doctoral students have helped sharpen research approaches to societies in East Asia, and as we can see from the range of papers at this conference, risk as a theme inspires good research questions.

If there is something unifying and universal about the risk-theme, it is perhaps that it sharpens our attention to normality and the institutions that guide human behavior. As society imperceptibly changes, conventions, practices and expectations are put under pressure, and power relations are shifted. By identifying how risks are perceived, we become better equipped to focus on change and to ask questions that cross the boundaries of any one taken-for-granted perception of normality or rationality. Thinking in terms of risk propels us into an innovative and questioning engagement with the changing social construction of reality, be it in terms of exchange of resources, the use of power, or the ways we organize our social world. More than concepts like, say, “authenticity,” “innovation”, or “the unexpected”, risk forces us to consider actors, decision makers, even innovators rather than victims and bystanders, for risk is the foundation of the agency of individuals, groups and corporate bodies facing change in their environment and who are therefore bound to change themselves.



**Flemming Christiansen**

*Speaker*



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## Wednesday, June 20, 2018

09.00–09.30 Registration

**Session Chair: Prof. Flemming Christiansen** *University of Duisburg-Essen*

09.30–09:45 **Opening Remarks**

Prof. Flemming Christiansen, PhD

*Speaker, DFG GRK 1613/2 Risk and East Asia, University of Duisburg-Essen*

09:45–10:20 **Trust of Nations – Cultural Manifold Analysis (CULMAN) on Longitudinal and Cross-national Survey of National Character**

Prof. Ryozo Yoshino

*Department of Data Science, The Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Japan*

10:20–10:45 Coffee Break

**Session Chair: Kei Takata** *University of Duisburg-Essen*

10:45–11:15 **Individuals and Social Change in China: Ideology and Decision Making**

Prof. Flemming Christiansen

*Speaker, DFG GRK 1613/2 Risk and East Asia, University of Duisburg-Essen*

11:15–11:45 **How to Quickly Shift from Social Concerns to a Viable Research Project? – At a Certain Cost**

Prof. Dingxin Zhao

*University of Chicago, USA; Zhejiang University, China*

11:45–12:15 **Risking it all: the “responsibilities” of single women in China**

Dr. Alison Lamont

*University of Roehampton, United Kingdom*

12:45–14:15 LUNCH

**Session Chair: Zi Wang** *University of Duisburg-Essen*

13:45–14:15 **The Social Order of Transnational Migration Markets – Cross-Border Labor Markets in East and Southeast Asia**

Prof. Karen Shire

*University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany*



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- 14:15–14:45 **Bridging the Institutional Gaps: International Education as a Migration Industry**  
Prof. Gracia Liu-Farrer  
*Waseda University, Japan*
- 14:45–15:15 Coffee Break
- 15:15–15:45 **The Ends Justify the Means: China's Securitization of Climate Change Mitigation**  
Dr. Ariel Macaspac Hernandez  
*Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research, Germany*
- 15:45–16:15 **China and the International Rule-Based System: Chinese International Obligations in Hong Kong and South China Sea**  
Claus Soong  
*Center for China and Globalization, Hong Kong*

## **Thursday, June 21, 2018**

**Session Chair: Vitali Heidt** *University of Duisburg-Essen*

- 09:30–10:00 **A Market with Chinese Characteristics – Some Notes on the Nationalisation of Market Risks in China's Latest Round of Debt-Equity-Swaps**  
Prof. Markus Taube  
*University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg*
- 10:00–10:30 **Political Economy of Womenomics**  
Prof. Margarita Estévez-Abe  
*Syracuse University, United States of America*
- 10:30–11:00 Coffee Break
- 11:00–11:30 **Social Risk and Social Risk Management in China's Growth-by-infrastructure Strategy**  
Prof. Bettina Gransow  
*Freie Universität Berlin, Germany*



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11:30–12:00 **European Institutions and the Framing of Risk in East Asia: North Korea, China and Japan**

Dr. Ra Mason

*University of East Anglia, United Kingdom*

12:00–13:30 LUNCH

**Session Chair: Huijie Chu** *University of Duisburg-Essen*

13:30–14:00 **Representation in an Authoritarian Context: The Case of China's Private Entrepreneurs**

Prof. Thomas Heberer

*University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany*

14:00–14:30 **At Risk of Exclusion: Language Revitalisation in the Japanese Ryukyu Islands**

Prof. Patrick Heinrich

*Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Italy*

14:30–15:00 Coffee Break

15:00–15:30 **Governing China's Higher Education: Institutional Setting, Reforms and Tensions**

Huijie Chu

*University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany*

15:30–16:00 **Political Connections and Private Entrepreneurs' Risk Behaviors in China**

Yao Lu

*University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany*

16:00–16:35 **Age of Opportunity, or Age of Risk: China as a Global Player**

Prof. Kerry Brown

*King's College London, United Kingdom*

16:35–16:50 **Closing Remarks**

Dr. Alison Lamont

*University of Roehampton, United Kingdom*





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# REA CONFERENCE 2018

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## ABSTRACTS AND BIOGRAPHIES

### **Ryozo YOSHINO**

*Department of Data Science, The Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Japan*

### ***Trust of Nations – Cultural Manifold Analysis (CULMAN) on Longitudinal and Cross-national Survey of National Character***

#### **Abstract**

The objective of this presentation is to overview social values of nations as reflected in the data of longitudinal and cross-national surveys conducted by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics over six decades (1953-present). The surveys are face-to-face interviews and based on nationwide statistical random sampling. The countries covered include the USA and European countries (UK, France, Germany, Italy, the and Netherlands), the East Asia (China [Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Hangzou, and Konming], Taiwan, the South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam), Australia, and India.

First, I explain about our research paradigm called Cultural Manifold Analysis (CULMAN) developed for cross-national comparability of survey data. The paradigm is developed to overcome problems of cross-national comparability due to differences of language, sampling method, peoples' general response tendencies. Second, some aspects of the fundamental social values of the Japanese identified in the Japanese National Character Survey are summarized. Third, I present cross-national analyses on social values including interpersonal trust, social trust on institutions, Confucius teachings and individuals' rights. Overall, under the paradigm of "Science of Data," our study shows that fundamental human relationships tend to be stable in each country over years. It shows also that some social values (e.g., the importance of family) are more universal beyond differences between the East and the West in spite of surficial variations.

I hope that this study provide some important information in order to avoid unnecessary conflicts between countries and to main the world peace and economic prosperity.

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## **Flemming CHRISTIANSEN**

*Speaker, DFG GRK 1613/2 Risk and East Asia, University of Duisburg-Essen*

### ***Individuals and Social Change in China: Ideology and Decision Making***



#### **Abstract**

The paper shall explore how ideologically driven policy making and individual decision making coexist in the social practice of the People's Republic of China. The main argument is that the roles and conditions of the Chinese individual have changed several during the last almost 70 years since the founding of the People's Republic.

The individualization of the reform period, i.e. the introduction of economic decision making autonomy in the late 1970s and early 1980s gave rise to a new mode of decision making. The paper argues that the institutions of autonomous decision making are part of a system of developmental ideology that enables and encourages certain forms of action on which local, professional and situational agreement is achieved. The monitoring and sanction of individual action is chiefly internalized by the individual within an environment of ever-changing institutions and ideological consensus-building.

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## **Dingxin ZHAO**

*University of Chicago, USA; Zhejiang University, China*

### ***How to Quickly Shift from Social Concerns to a Viable Research Project? – At a Certain Cost***



#### **Abstract**

In this talk, I am going to introduce a top-down research strategy aiming at explaining variations in social phenomena by social mechanisms. The talk will discuss what is social mechanism, how to raise research questions following this mechanism-based research tradition, what are the advantages and drawbacks of this tradition, and what are some of the partial solutions to the problems of mechanism-based explanation. I will end this talk by an argument that even though this top-down research strategy has significant weaknesses, it is also the heart of social sciences.

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## **Alison LAMONT**

*University of Roehampton, United Kingdom*

### ***Risking it all: the “responsibilities” of single women in China***



#### **Abstract**

There has been a recent flourishing of academic interest in the phenomenon of so-called “leftover” women (*shengnü* 剩女). The castigation of highly educated, well paid, urban women for not marrying has broadly painted these women as either “picky” (for refusing to settle) or “pitiable” (for being unattractive). Research to date has explored the media discourses and social reactions to this phenomenon largely through the lens of gender inequality and patriarchy.

This paper proposes to explore *shengnü* instead as a risk phenomenon which springs from the dominance of the family as an institution that guarantees welfare, particularly in old age. Drawing from an analysis of online media sources (The People’s Daily, All China Women’s Federation news, and discussions of *shengnü* on popular forums like Tianya), findings show that the core critique of unmarried women is that they are “irresponsible” because they are not safeguarding their old age by forming a stable couple and having children: other words they are not forming a family, the institution which is understood to mitigate the risks of old age. This both builds on international findings of “compulsory coupledness” (Wilkinson, 2012) that have emerged in other contexts and also gives an important counterexample to research which has revealed the mix of pressure and openness that mainland Chinese gay and lesbian couples experience in discussions of their future care. The importance of this risk perspective, then, is to demonstrate how the dominance of family in understanding the negotiation of aging in an aging society alienates and even demonizes those who find themselves living “alternative” lifestyles to the nuclear norm. The demographic pressures experienced by China’s single women is framed as individual choice, rather than systemic outcome, and removes state and market responsibility for finding solutions to the projected future problems of singletons.

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## **Karen SHIRE**

*University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany*

### ***The social order of transnational migration markets – cross-border labor markets in East and Southeast Asia***



#### **Abstract**

In this talk I present a sociological theory of migration labour markets. I draw on the market-making approach of the new sociology of markets and adapt this to the specificities of labour markets. I argue that migration labour markets are fundamentally the same as other labour markets in how they must find solutions to the risks market actors face in the reproduction of labour power and in the control of labour. Regulatory states play a central role in mitigating these risks through social protections and labour standards to create a social order of labour markets. The difference however, between labour markets which form nationally and those which are forming transnationally is that risks cross borders, and neither sellers nor buyers of migrant labour power can rely on (any one) regulatory state for mitigating the uncertainties of labour exchanges. Recent research on the migration industry in the Asia Pacific demonstrates how migration is increasingly formalized by sending and receiving states, and provides rich evidence about the central role of intermediaries – recruitment agencies and staffing firms – in the operation of migration markets. Reviewing the evidence about transnational labor mobility in East Asia and Southeast Asia from the theoretical perspective of the new sociology of markets generates insights into how transnational labour markets are being made, the role of new private actors and the state, and the consequences as well as contradictions in the production of a social order of transnational migration markets.

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## **Gracia LIU-FARRER**

*Waseda University, Japan*

### ***Bridging the Institutional Gaps: International Education as a Migration Industry***



#### **Abstract**

This paper examines the education-migration industry that has channelled students from China and Vietnam into Japan over the past three decades and discusses the conditions for the emergence of such an industry, the major actors and reasons for their changing roles and practices. Drawing on data collected over the past two decades, including interviews with both current and former language students in Japan, study abroad agencies in China and Vietnam, language school administrators and teachers, and officers of the Japanese Association of Student Support Organisation (JASSO), the paper argues that the education-migration industry in Japan emerges because of the gaps between not only social networks but also institutional logics. Japan has been reluctant to open the door for the import of workers despite its acute labour shortage. It does, however, in the name of globalisation welcome international students. Such persistent gaps between economic imperatives for labour import and Japan government's restriction on immigration makes international education a convenient channel for both student and labour mobility, giving opportunities for an education-migration industry to emerge and thrive. The education-migration industry is therefore a derivative of Japan's immigration regime and interacts actively with government policies.

This migration industry has been responsible for channelling hundreds of thousands of students across borders. Unfortunate outcomes can be attributed to the greed of the actors in this industry; nevertheless, it should be noted that the government is also complicit. As long as the institutional gap exists, government regulations over the migration industry will only create new sources of power and profits for brokers who can navigate complex regulations and use illicit means to satisfy the legal requirements, and thereby the risks posed to migrants remain.

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## **Ariel Macaspac HERNANDEZ**

*Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research, Germany*

### ***The Strategic Securitization of Climate Change Mitigation: China's Alignment of Environmental Policy Priorities with Security as a Game Changer***



#### **Abstract**

The presence of risks and the attendant search for security are core features of the determination of policy priorities and of international relations. Traditionally, security has been studied as a function of power politics and thus has embraced a military/political understanding of the phenomenon. At the end of the Cold War, the overarching shift from traditional security to a wider agenda forms the backdrop of the Copenhagen School's concept of securitization, the key of which is the rhetorical structure of how an issue is argued and presented as an existential threat. Its main contribution is that it highlights the importance of agenda-setting and persuasion.

This tool is useful in analyzing how China's securitization of climate change has evolved. While China is currently the biggest emitter of greenhouse gas, it now pursues more ambitious climate mitigation policies because doing so enables it to sustain its economic growth, ensures the output legitimacy of its regime, and allows a new kind of global leadership, particularly after the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Climate Agreement. The entry points for climate mitigation in China are the results of strategic reforms, such as the institutionalization of dualism on governance with two elements – the dignified (political elite) and the efficient (technical elite) – working together. With these reforms, China is able to effectively align environmental policy goals with security priorities. As such, co-benefits and synergies arising through alignments become multipliers, which further produce values. China's experience therefore demonstrates a nuanced understanding of security: it is no longer an end goal, but an instrument to promote other policy priorities.

In making climate mitigation the top priority, China has successfully securitized climate change. However, this is distinct from the usual persuasion processes that the Copenhagen School spoke of in that it did not include any discussion or contestation, much less the approval of an "audience." Our paper examines this distorted securitization process. We argue that China managed to put climate change on top of the agenda because addressing climate change allowed it to achieve other security goals. Securitizing climate change led to the possibility of circumventing democratic processes by providing alternative processes that offered similar utility and by formalizing the "tolerable window" for the technical elite.

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## **Claus SOONG**

*Center for China and Globalization, Hong Kong*

### ***China and the international Rule-Based System: Chinese International Obligations in Hong Kong and South China Sea***



#### **Abstract**

This paper aims to sketch the Chinese global strategy and its engagement to international law by reviewing Chinese attitude and response on its international obligation. I will review the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 and its effect on Hong Kong and UNCLOS on South China Sea from a Chinese perspectives. By comparing the Chinese responses and action on its obligations in the two major international law issues under the first term of President Xi Jinping, this paper is trying to answer that whether China is an observer or reformer of the current international rule based system.

The comparison would support the argument of this paper that China is still puzzled with self-regarding victimization resulted by the historical trauma while possessing the mind set of practical realists on international law as the need for rising as a global power. From the history on dealing with the imperial powers in 19th and 20th Century, the injustice on China fueled nationalism as the root of contemporary Chinese politics. When sovereignty and territorial issues are raised, the pressure from domestic politics made China react assertively on international law. However, aiming to be more engaged with global governance, can China still put emphasis on solving dispute on bilateral negotiation rather than multilateral procedure is an issue deserve further observation. The changing direction of Chinese foreign policy might show the duality of Chinese attitude on international law, and the higher possibility for having disputes among the relevant countries in East Asia.

From the responses and analysis in Chinese literature, the Chinese understanding on international law as a mean, rather than as an end, would shape Chinese global strategy as maintaining the stability in the world by constructing the "Community of Shared Future for Mankind", although such community might be very different than the current international order. The comparison between Hong Kong and South China Sea also reflect the ambivalence of China on using international law to pursue the status of great power.

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## **Markus TAUBE**

*University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany*

### ***A Market with Chinese Characteristics – Some Notes on the Nationalisation of Market Risks in China's Latest Round of Debt-Equity-Swaps***



#### **Abstract**

One major element of industrial policy under the Xi presidency are the supply side structural reforms designed to reduce the leverage of companies in a variety of industries. Debt-equity-swaps constitute a prominent component of this strategy. The idea behind the move is to lower corporate leverage and cut financing costs by replacing high-interest bank loans with relatively low-cost (dividend) equity capital. While announced as a policy initiative to be implemented according to market signals and support only such firms that are (in principle) competitive, the first actually implemented debt-equity-swaps document a different practice. Rather than strengthening market processes the policy appears to once again nationalize corporate debt and shift the risks of corporatist management failures to China's tax payers.

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## **Margarita ESTÉVEZ-ABE**

*Syracuse University, United States of America*

### ***Political Economy of Womenomics***



#### **Abstract**

Under the current Abe Government, Japan seems to have accelerated the speed of policy change that concerns gender equality and work-family reconciliation policies. This paper examines the recent policy developments and seeks to explain the political context behind them. In particular, the paper focuses on the specific combination of the concentration of political power and the labor shortage that concurrently occurred around 2014 as the major driver of the aforementioned policy developments.

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## **Bettina GRANSOW**

*Freie Universität Berlin, Germany*

### ***Social risk and social risk management in China's growth-by-infrastructure strategy***



#### **Abstract**

China's growth-by-infrastructure strategy, which became crucial for China's development agenda of reform and opening up, can be divided into three main stages. A first stage began from 1978 and continued through the 1980s and 1990s with a focus on large-scale projects in the transportation, energy and water conservancy sectors inside China. A second stage began from the early 21st century characterized by Chinese bilateral infrastructure lending as a central part of China's South-South cooperation; and a third stage started with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and initiated the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 as a multilateral development bank with infrastructure investment as its unique selling point. Each of these three stages can be related to specific sources of financing infrastructure projects and to particular ways in defining social risks and impacts arising during the project cycle. The paper explores the kind of knowledge that has been considered relevant in conceptualizing social risk and designing social risk management in each of these three phases. Based on key person background interviews (2016) and documentary review the paper focuses on the question of whether the understanding of social risk and social risk management at AIIB is predominantly shaped by China's own experience and related tools such as the Social Stability Risk Assessment (SSRA) or whether it owes more to social sustainability standards of pre-existing multilateral lenders.

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## **Ra MASON**

*University of East Anglia, United Kingdom*

### ***European Institutions and the Framing of Risk in East Asia: North Korea, China and Japan***



#### **Abstract**

The contemporary era of marketization is characterized as a time of great uncertainty and grave risks. From checks on central banks, big business and bureaucracies, to state security systems, citizens' rights and the pillars of participatory democracy itself, a hugely diverse intersection of established institutions that were previously viewed with assuredness in the developed world are now seen to be at risk. In Europe, country-specific risks identified within the international system have come to be analysed and evaluated with ever greater scrutiny in minute detail. In





fact, this is now to the extent where, conversely, it is increasingly problematic to differentiate between a myriad of different forms of risk and how these are prioritized by key stakeholders, such as policymakers, mainstream media outlets and populations at large. In addressing the resulting conceptual and analytical disparateness, this paper first revisits the distinction between risk and threat in order to illustrate significant shifts in how primary and subsidiary risks are now identified and articulated at the institutional level.

Having thereby established a revised risk framework, the paper then applies a mixed-method analysis in empirically examining how multiple European institutions have (re)interpreted risks identified with three interrelated countries in East Asia. These focus in particular on a range of security risks discussed in relation to market-based changes in contemporary North Korea, China and Japan, with specific attention given to the period beginning from Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's return to power in 2012. Preliminary findings suggest that while the comparative level of risks identified with each of these states by state, market and societal institutions across Europe has – for the most part – changed relatively little, the priority given to different forms of risk and the responses to them has changed significantly in each case. In this regard, the paper offers an up-to-date prism through which the process of risk mediation and recalibration can be observed at the institutional level. If taken at face value, the implications for issue-framing and contingent policy responses could be considerable and wide-reaching.

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## **Thomas HEBERER**

*University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany*

### ***Representation in an Authoritarian Context: The Case of China's Private Entrepreneurs***



#### **Abstract**

This paper sheds light on two issues: (1) Political representation in an authoritarian context, particularly the Chinese context, and (2) taking formal and informal representation of private entrepreneurs in China as a case study. It presents initial and preliminary findings from a) the literature review and b) field research in various areas in China. Regarding (2) we explore the way in which entrepreneurs act in a collective manner, i.e. as a group and what this means for the issue of representation and self-representation. An argument frequently found in the scientific literature is that private entrepreneurs in China are largely an atomized group of individuals acting primarily in their own interests. It is also argued that they suffer from political immaturity and a lack of political potential. In contrast, the present paper contends that private entrepreneurs constitute a specific group increasingly represented by representatives or a kind of self-representation (e.g. via Internet chatting and blogging).

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## **Patrick HEINRICH**

*Ca'Foscari University of Venice, Italy*

### ***Representation in an Authoritarian Context: The Case of China's Private Entrepreneurs***



#### **Abstract**

"Why is it so hard to save a threatened language" is the title a classical paper in the field of endangered language studies. In abstract terms, the answer is quite easy. Saving languages involves risks. It involves risks because attempts of saving endangered languages means to break free from the modernist project of bringing universality, homogeneity, monotony and clarity to society. As a matter of fact, in modern societies languages are endangered due to the high valuation of such attributes. Needless to say that the modernist dream never became reality, but that does not mean that it did not affect language and society. Minority languages "disturb" the modernist imagination of the nation, and its speakers come under pressure to shift to the dominant (national or official) language, because modern societies know only two ways how to deal with diversity: assimilation or exclusion. This is why it is so hard to save a threatened language. It entails the risk of exclusion from national solidarity. In modern societies, the rationale usually goes as follows: "If you save your endangered language by speaking it among yourselves you will no longer be one of us." However, as Japan is transforming from a modern to a late modern society, a growing number of activists, politicians, educators, journalists, etc. in the Ryukyu Islands are trying to save their endangered languages. They have to do so in the situation sketched put above. Language activists are taking risks for two important reasons. Firstly, participating in the modernist project of self-assimilation did not bring the progress that was promised and, secondly, they strive for freedom of (language) choices. In this presentation, I present Ryukyuan language revitalization activities on this theoretical backdrop. Language revitalization is in conflict with national policies, and there is no official language policy in place to save Ryukyuan languages. Activists seek to realize their objectives by finding opportunities in the Japanese language policy for Ryukyuan languages, by contesting and resisting national policy and by a wide-range of ever growing grassroots activities. I will provide a number of examples for all three cases.

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## **Huijie CHU**

*University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany*

### ***Governing China's Higher Education: Institutional Setting, Reforms and Tensions***



#### **Abstract**

This presentation begins with a brief introduction of the socioeconomic and political backdrop against which China's higher education reforms take place in the past four decades. It then features the institutional transformations by explaining firstly, decentralization and marketization of provision and funding, which, along with the reforms of welfare provision, assumes increased local initiatives and individual responsibilities; secondly, functional centralization and recentralization of the recruitment and assessment system to maintain central monitoring and control for higher efficiency, educational equality and market demand.

I uncover that the process of policy-making and implementation is not a strictly top-down but rather an interactive one. There are negotiations and tensions among multiple stakeholders at central, local (mainly provincial and city) as well as education institution levels. Their collaborative and competitive relationships demonstrate the dynamics and complexity within the institutional framework of higher education, which offers an insight into the debates regarding educational reforms and equality in China.

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## **Yao LU**

*University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany*

### ***Political Connections and Private Entrepreneurs' Risk Behaviors in China***



#### **Abstract**

China has a long tradition to use social ties to conduct business activities, or to explore new opportunities. As the emergency of private enterprise sector in China since 1990s, the private enterprise sector has become a major contribution to the economic miracle of China's rapid economic growth. In China's environment, due to the lack of property rights protection, private entrepreneurs usually seek protection from local government/carders. Guanxi with government/carders can provide protection from serious risks. This research tries to explore how political connections affect private entrepreneurs' risk preferences. Under the market environment in



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China, private entrepreneurs with or without guanxi can be different. To some extent, guanxi as an informal institution can help private firms against institutional uncertainty in China's background and is also a way for private entrepreneurs to avoid losses in business decisions. On the contrary, private entrepreneurs without guanxi need to face institutional uncertainty on their own. I assume that the risk behaviors between private entrepreneurs with guanxi are different from those private entrepreneurs without guanxi. To explore the impact of political connections on private entrepreneurs' risk attitudes, I use economic experiment to test my hypothesis. This experiment has been conducted in Chongqing city in China with real subjects, small-medium sized private entrepreneurs in this city. I use incentivized tasks to measure the different attitudes between private entrepreneurs with and without Guanxi. After finishing the lab-in-the-field experiment, I use statistical analysis to compare their risk preferences.

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## **Kerry BROWN**

*King's College London, United Kingdom*

### ***Age of Opportunity, or Age of Risk: China as a Global Player***

#### **Abstract**

In modern history, China has never before enjoyed a moment of such great opportunity. Poised to become the world's largest economy, perhaps some time in the next decade, it is also placed in a leadership position in areas from support of free trade to combating climate change. And yet China's domestic challenges remain daunting, and its foreign policy outlook is an accretion of different, and often inconsistent, postures from the last six decades of the Communist Party being in power. This presentation will look at the challenges of the Xi era, how it is aiming to create a more proactive foreign policy that is honest to its strengths and what it feels are its rightful ambitions, but is also able to avoid potentially damaging competition and conflict with, in particular, the US.

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## PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION BETWEEN “DIE WOLFSBURG” AND DUISBURG

The nearest tram station to “Die Wolfsburg” is **Mülheim Monning**. It is on the **901** line. If you are staying in the city center of Duisburg it is most likely that you will have to catch the 901 at the Duisburg Main Train Station (North entrance, **Duisburg Hbf**). The trip from Duisburg Hbf to Monning (and vice versa) takes 7 minutes. Trams leave Duisburg Hbf every 15 minutes Monday through Friday from 3:53 am to 7:38 pm.

Trams leave Duisburg Hbf at: 08 min. 23 min. 38 min. and 53 min. past the hour. Arriving at Mülheim Monning at 15 min. 30 min. 45 min. and 00 min. past the hour respectively.

The distance from Monning station to “Die Wolfsburg” is 850 m uphill (approx. 12 min.). **See the map on the next page for details.**

Please note that trams leaving Duisburg Hbf at times other than those shown above terminate at Duisburg Zoo/Uni, which is one station before Monning.

Trams leave Mülheim Monning every 15 minutes Monday through Friday from 4:45 am to 8:00 pm.

Trams leave Mülheim Monning at: 00 min. 15 min. 30 min. and 45 min. past the hour. Arriving at Duisburg Hbf at 07 min. 22 min. 37 min. and 52 min. past the hour respectively.

For tram times after 7:30 pm please see the official time table available at [https://www.dvg-duisburg.de/uploads/tx\\_medownload/public/Einzellinienplan\\_901.pdf](https://www.dvg-duisburg.de/uploads/tx_medownload/public/Einzellinienplan_901.pdf)





## WALKING DIRECTIONS FROM MÜLHEIM MONNING

<https://goo.gl/maps/7nxWkDTPYhp>



- ↑ Head east on Duisburger Str. toward Prinzenhöhe (71 m)
- ↪ Turn right onto Prinzenhöhe (280 m)
- ↶ Turn left to stay on Prinzenhöhe (23 m)
- ↷ Slight right to stay on Prinzenhöhe (21 m)
- ↪ Turn right to stay on Prinzenhöhe (83 m)
- ↑ Continue onto Bussardweg (250 m)
- ↪ Turn right onto Falkenweg (130 m)

Destination will be on the right

### Die Wolfsburg

Falkenweg 6, 45478 Mülheim an der Ruhr

